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 Executive Summary 
 
Kleit and Lutter identify externalities of about $0.08 per mile for driving light duty 
vehicles. Rather than recognize the huge externalities from current driving, they focus on a tiny 
increment that would come from increasing CAFE standards. A first best policy would tax 
congestion, pollution emissions and gasoline, and increase safety. If that policy is not politically 
feasible, a second best policy would increase gasoline taxes $1.75 per gallon. Contrary to Kleit 
and Lutter, we find sound economic reasons for CAFE. 
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We thank Kleit and Lutter for their critique of our work. Unfortunately, they still cannot 
see the elephant in the living room. Since we do not desire to prolong the debate, we will keep 
this reply short. 
Kleit and Lutter assert that increasing CAFE is bad because the reduction in the variable 
cost of driving would lead to driving more miles, which would increase congestion, air pollution, 
and injuries and deaths. We agree, but think the effect is small.  
The elephant in the living room that Kleit and Lutter keep ignoring is the huge driving 
externalities that they estimate. To attain efficiency, we need to internalize these externalities. 
We noted that a gasoline tax is a second best way to reduce congestion, air pollution, and 
injuries. But, if a gasoline tax is the only instrument at hand, we should use it, recognizing that it 
will create inefficiencies in dealing with the externalities. The magnitude of the externalities they 
estimate suggests a gasoline tax $1.75 per gallon higher than the current tax.  
We prefer a first best policy: Congestion tolls, tradable emissions permits, and optimized 
safety. Kleit and Lutter do not comment on the need for these policies, transaction costs 
involved, or the role for additional regulation to internalize them. Since the externality costs 
exceed $100 billion per year, they surely merit attention. Kleit and Lutter attend to these costs for 
the additional vehicle miles that would result from raising CAFE, but neglect the externalities 
that now exist.  
In our judgment, even if the congestion, air pollution, and safety externalities were fully 
internalized, there would still be a justification for CAFE. The fourth externality is the cost of a 
marginal barrel of petroleum to the U.S.  Security concerns are estimated to add a $5 to $10 per 
barrel risk premium to the price of oil. The two Gulf wars together with our foreign and defense 
policies focused on keeping the oil flowing imply that the marginal cost of a barrel of oil is 
surely higher than the current market price. Thus, the price of a gallon of gasoline does not 
reflect this security cost or a greenhouse gas emissions cost. Taxing gasoline is a first best policy 
instrument for dealing with these two externalities.  
Finally, we point out a peculiarity in the design of motor vehicles: Over a range of fuel 
economies, the lifetime cost of owning a vehicle is about constant. At the bottom of this range   2
are vehicles with lower purchase price and high fuel costs while the top of the range has vehicles 
with higher purchase price and lower fuel costs. Security, greenhouse gas, and sustainability 
concerns lead society to prefer that the consumer choose a vehicle at the top of the fuel economy 
range while consumers are likely to choose the vehicle with the lowest sticker price. Using 
CAFE to close the gap between private and social costs is not paternalistic, as Kleit and Lutter 
contend, it is a textbook economic treatment of external costs. We agree that consumers who are 
credit constrained or who face high interest rates would be hurt by a CAFE that did not allow 
them to buy vehicles at the bottom end of the range. The adverse distributional effects of energy 
efficiency standards, vehicle safety standards, air pollution control standards, etc. are well 
known. The best way of dealing with these distributional effects is to give the poor more income, 
not to force society to bear a polluted environment, unsafe highways, and future Gulf wars. A 
host of laws and regulations agree that these adverse distributional effects are not a bar to dealing 
with social problems. 
Thus, our argument is two-fold. First, Kleit and Lutter miss the elephant in the living 
room by focusing on the relatively small external costs of additional driving while neglecting the 
huge externalities associated with current driving. Their argument is misleading because they 
attribute enormous costs to the CAFE program that are due to our failure to internalize current 
externalities. Second, we offer two economic rationales for CAFE as a policy instrument:  
(1) market outcomes that systematically favor the low-end of the fuel economy range; and (2) the 
evidently wide divergence between private and social discount rates for fuel conservation.  
Our preferred solution is congestion tolls, tradable emissions permits, internalization of 
vehicle and driving safety externalities, increased gasoline taxes to account for energy security 
and greenhouse gas emissions, and an increase in CAFE that takes vehicles up to the top of the 
fuel economy range where the lifetime cost of owning a vehicle is approximately the same, using 
social rates of discount. If the direct ways of internalizing the congestion, air pollution, and 
safety externalities are not available, we would, regretfully, support a gasoline tax that was a 
second best solution. 
  